

25X1C10b

Approved For Release 1999/08/24 : CIA-RDP78-03061A000200040003-4

Next 1 Page(s) In Document Exempt

Approved For Release 1999/08/24 : CIA-RDP78-03061A000200040003-4

Briefly Noted

Rumanians Split With Soviets to Support Nuclear-Free Latin America

On 19 November, the UN General Assembly voted 89 to 0, with 14 abstentions, for a study to make Latin America a de-nuclearized zone. Two points were notable about this vote:

1. Despite a history of espousing denuclearized zones, and especially a denuclearized zone in Europe (Bapacki Plan), neither the Soviet Union nor Poland voted for the measure: they abstained.

2. For the first time in UN history, the Rumanian representative did not follow the Soviet example, but voted for the measure.

Most of the Bloc abstained out of (Soviet) regard for Cuba. Castro claims that there can be no Latin American nuclear-free zone unless the US formally promises not to base nuclear weapons in the Canal Zone, Puerto Rico and elsewhere in Latin America, and unless the US returns Guantanamo to Cuba. The US position is that we will support and abide by any nuclear-free zone, providing it embraces the whole region in question, does not upset the military balance of power (this is one major weakness of the Bapacki plan), is supported by all area nations, and provides for verification that there are no nuclear weapons. These provisions, and especially verification, are what Cuba really objects to. The Kremlin is more anxious to appease Castro (for fear he may turn to Peking) than it is to follow its old policy on de-nuclearized zones. Actually, the Kremlin's old policy has been merely a disguised diplomatic attempt to break down the NATO position in Europe and win sympathy on other continents.

The Rumanian delegation expressed support for Cuba's position, but their government felt it more important to abide by the old policy than to follow Moscow's shift. Rumania has recently had differences with the USSR over CEMA and other matters, but unlike Albania, she is not merely exchanging one master for another. The Rumanian vote marks a new step in the weakening of Communist discipline and in the emergence of independence in the Bloc.

25X1C10b



Chinese Communist Reaction to President Kennedy's Death.

In rude contrast to the world's spontaneous tributes and mourning at the tragic death of President Kennedy, an official of the Chinese People's Republic said, "That's good news. He was a very wicked man." The CDR's Worker's Daily carried a cartoon with a caption reading "Kennedy Siting the Dust," and depicting the President in a position of gruesome distortion. In Djakarta the CDR's Embassy, alone, and in disregard of the Indonesian Government's proclamation, flew its flag from the top of the flagpole as usual. In Africa, the seven-man CDR delegation to the Afro-Asian attorneys conference in Conakry, Guinea, walked out, alone, when the Chairman asked members to stand for one minute in silent tribute to the slain President. At the World Peace Council meeting in Warsaw the 30-man Chinese Communist delegation protested angrily and refused to join in the standing homage to President Kennedy.

On April 12, 1945 Joseph Goebbels received the "glad" news of the passing of President Roosevelt with the words "This is the miracle we've been waiting for." In a call to Hitler he said "My Fuehrer, I congratulate you. Roosevelt is dead. Fate has laid low your greatest enemy. God has not abandoned us. A miracle has happened. It is written that the second half of April will be the turning point for us. This is (now) Friday, April 13. It is the turning point." But little more than two weeks later, Hitler and his lieutenants were dead, by their own hands, and the "Thousand Year Reich" came to an end.

As appropriate to selected audiences, we compare the reactions of the Fascists and the Chinese Communists, -- pointing out their fanaticism, their self-imposed isolation from all civilized nations -- and we note the end to Nazism which followed upon a tragic event interpreted by them as a good omen in their aggression against civilized humanity.

The Lesson of Venezuela

Throughout the year 1963, the government of Rómulo Betancourt and the Venezuelan people have been the objects of a campaign of violence and sabotage without parallel in Latin America. Note also the theatrical, even exhibitionist, manner in which it has been carried out. The activists of the FALN (Fuerzas Armadas de Liberación Nacional) are said to number less than 500. They are supported by Fidel Castro, as evidenced by the arms cache discovered early in November in eastern Venezuela, but it is equally certain that they are under the discipline of

the official Communist Party of Venezuela.

The purpose of this spectacular campaign has been to keep the elections from taking place: 1) by sabotaging public confidence in the viability of democratic government; 2) by provoking President Betancourt into taking repressive measures so severe as to alienate public support; 3) by tempting the military to stage a coup d'etat; and 4) by frightening the voters, at the last moment, into staying home on election day. However, over 90% of the voters went to the polls Sunday, 1 December; the FAIIN has failed utterly to achieve any one of its objectives. All it has achieved is the senseless murder and maiming of hundreds of innocent people and the equally meaningless destruction of millions of dollars of property, representing a net loss to Venezuela.

Regardless of who is elected, we point out the lesson to be drawn from recent events in Venezuela: that the rule of law can be maintained and orderly political succession achieved if the responsible elements in the government show enough determination. What many democratic governments do not realize is that 30% of all subversion is initiated and carried out by a fraction of one per cent of the population. President Betancourt apparently realized this and consequently refused to be intimidated. We warn other Latin American countries that Castro might now focus his subversive exports upon their territories. We use the case of V. for our continuing campaign against Castro.

POPULAR/UNITED FRONTS

An authoritative Communist statement of the "why and how" of the popular front tactic. "Party Policy and the Party Branch" by the French CP is reprinted from the World Marxist Review of April 1963 with explanatory comments juxtaposed to revealing passages of Communist objectives in seeking collaboration with non-Communist forces in free countries. Applicable to the range of Communist subversive activities in widely differing country situations.

In asking for copies, refer to
PROPAGANDA NOTES (PN) #27.

DATES OF PROPAGANDA INTEREST

December Afro-Asian Organization for Economic Cooperation, 4th AAOEC, scheduled for Karachi, 1963.

21 Dec Stalin born (1879).

26 Dec Mao Tse-tung born (1893 - 70 years).

January L.A. Trade Union Fed. Constituent Cong. (WFTU sponsored) Rio de Janeiro, Jan. 1964.

2 Jan Fidel Castro assumes power in Cuba, 1959.

4 Jan XXVth Internl. Cong. of Orientalists, New Delhi Jan. 4-11, 1964

15 Jan "Trial of the 12" first show trial of Stalinist purge, including Zinoviev and Kamenev (initial members Stalin ruling triumvirate during Lenin's physical decline), 1938.

21 Jan Lenin dies, 1924 (40th anniv) (born 22 April 1870).

26 Jan Second Congress of Soviets meets: Stalin swears allegiance to Lenin's policies, 1924.

31 Jan Leon Trotsky banished for life, 1929 (35th anniv.)

31 Jan Cuban Marxist-Leninist Government excluded from participation inter-American system by Foreign Ministers at Punta del Este, 1962.

1 Feb UNGA adopts resolution charging Chinese Communist aggression in Korea, 1951.

2 Feb Estonian-Soviet Peace Treaty signed: Soviet Government "forever renounces sovereign rights over people and territory of Estonia," 1920.

14 Feb USSR and CPR sign treaty of alliance (Sino-Soviet Friendship Pact) repudiating Soviet Nationalist Treaty (14 August 1945), 1950.

14 Feb Khrushchev denounces Stalin in secret speech at CPSU 20th Congress, 14-25 Feb. 1956.

23 Feb Kronstadt Uprising begins by supporters of Oct. 1917 Revolution against "three-year-old autocracy of Communist Commissars" (1921)

25 Feb Soviets imprison leader of Smallholders' Party, Bela Kovacs, in campaign to destroy major anti-Communist opposition, Hung. 1947.

26 Feb Internl. Conf. of Youth and Students for Disarmament, Peace and National Independence (WFEDY-sponsored), Florence, Italy, 26 Feb-1 Mar 1963.

27 Feb Mao Tse-tung delivers "Hundred Flowers" speech, 1957.

~~SECRET~~

PROPAGANDIST'S GUIDE TO COMMUNIST DISSENSIONS

#17

9-22 November 1963

Commentary

Principal Developments:

1. Only one major contribution to the Great Feud appeared during this period, a 19 November 10,000-word, joint People's Daily/ Red Flag diatribe entitled "Two Different Lines on the Question of War and Peace." Designated as the fifth in the series of such joint Chinese articles replying directly to the 14 July CPSU open letter, it is probably the most extreme of all authoritative expressions by either of the protagonists to date, in its political/theoretical formulations, its derisive denunciation of CPSU views, and its insulting personal attacks on Khrushchev. (See extensive review in Chronology, November 19.)

2. The Albanians published another 7,000-word tirade against Tito which struck at Khrushchev in passing, but it did not equal in intensity some of the previous Albanian attacks. (November 9.) The North Vietnamese monthly theoretical journal Hoc Tap carried a 5,000-word article ponderously defending "the Revolutionary Principles of the Two Moscow Statements," which not only denounced the "Yugoslav revisionist clique" but also criticized "a number of persons (who) are claiming that the analysis of the Tito clique by the 1960 statement is wrong." (November 16.)

3. We have seen no reports of polemical materials in Soviet or pro-Soviet organs during this period, although the Chinese claimed on the 15th that "the Soviet press is vigorously keeping up its anti-China campaign," publishing more than 20 attacks, Soviet as well as foreign, from 23 October to 10 November. The few examples cited appeared before 9 November.

4. Meanwhile, various sources reported that the CPSU had taken the initiative in exploring with the Chinese the prospects for holding a second round of bilateral talks between delegations of the two parties. NYTimes Moscow correspondent Tanner reported (Chrono, November 20) "informed sources" as saying that consultations of this nature were taking place with members of the Chinese Embassy in Moscow, and that "it now appears that such a conference will take place in Peking....early next year." Other reports regarding discussions in Moscow during and following the October Revolution celebration have been conflicting. Representatives of several minor parties have returned home reporting that the Soviets made no attempt to draw them into any meetings. A secret report tells of a 19 November meeting of top Belgian and French CP leaders who agreed to issue a joint resolution rejecting the Chinese line and expressing hope for an all-Parties conference as soon as possible.

5. Meanwhile, the important Japanese CP restated its "independent attitude toward the disputes in the international Communist movement" in terms attuned to the Chinese line and emphasized its views that "an international conference must be held only after necessary conditions are sufficiently provided through prior consultation." (November 10) Rumania further demonstrated her "independence" by voting in opposition to a USSR position (on a resolution barring nuclear weapons in Latin America) in the UN for the first time in history (November 19), while boss Georghiu-Dej decided to take up a long-standing invitation to visit Yugoslavia (November 22).

6. Among the smaller parties, the trends toward independence and split continued. The recent soul-searching in the Swedish CP produced an amazing article in the Party's daily organ Ny Dag by prominent leader Landin categorically rejecting the 1360 Moscow Declaration and advocating complete autonomy in policy with a reconstitution of the Party, possibly in the form of a "socialist peoples party." (Described in Chronology under November 20, but the date has subsequently been determined to be Nov. 9: please make correction to your copies.) In Britain, a new pro-Chinese "Committee for Communist Unity" issued a manifesto signed by 14 CPGB members appealing to all members to defeat the pro-Soviet "revisionists" in the Party leadership and establish a "genuine" Party. (November 11)

Significance:

Available evidence (neither clear-cut nor reliable) seems to indicate that the Soviets have now decided to undertake to schedule another round of bilateral discussions with the Chinese and are unilaterally refraining from further polemics while the effort is being made. It seems most likely, however, that the Soviets do not expect to achieve any resolution of the conflict by this effort, but are making it primarily as another step in avoiding the onus for further deterioration in relations and as further preparation for a possible excommunication move. Meanwhile, the Chinese and their allies have shown no sign of retreat from their extreme positions. There has been no reported shifting in allegiance among the parties of the world, but evidence indicates some further growth in "independence" and splitting tendencies.

25X1C10b

25X1C10b

Approved For Release 1999/08/24 : CIA-RDP78-03061A000200040003-4

Approved For Release 1999/08/24 : CIA-RDP78-03061A000200040003-4

CHRONOLOGY -- COMMUNIST DISSENSIONS

#17

9-22 November 1963

November 9 - The Albanian Zeri I Popullit publishes another 7,000-word tirade, "Other Acts of Treachery by the Renegade Tito," also denouncing "the hostile splitting activity of the N. Khrushchev group, which supports the Tito gang and follows in its footsteps."

November 10 - The Japanese CP Sunday weekly Akahata carries an anonymous question-and-answer-type feature giving the Party's views on "the so-called 'international dispute.'" It affirms that "the JCP takes an independent attitude toward disputes in the international Communist movement," and "does not state which party is right, who is right, or who should be supported for the advantage of the JCP." However, it does answer "some people (who) contend that the CCP wants war" by stating "we believe that such a view is utterly unfounded" and that "the Japanese people . . . could not believe that the CPR Government and CP are warlike," and it expresses disapproval of "the leaders of certain Communist parties" who started "open criticism of those parties which had not agreed with them" at the 1960 Moscow conference, specifically, criticism of the Albanian Workers Party and the CCP.

The feature concludes by maintaining "that an international conference must be held only after necessary conditions are sufficiently provided through prior consultation between fraternal parties . . ." (The text was reprinted in full in all Peking papers on the 12th.)

November 11 - The British press reports that "a campaign to overthrow the leadership of the Communist Party of Great Britain began over the weekend." 2,000 copies of a 5-page manifesto signed by 14 Communists who claim they represent "cadres" throughout Britain were mailed to leading Party workers: it bitterly criticizes Soviet views and supports the Chinese, appeals to all Party members to "defeat the revisionists" in the Party leadership and establish a "genuine" CP. It accuses Khrushchev of "outright betrayal" and attacks General Secretary Gollan, and Daily Worker editor Matthews for supporting him. Secretary pro-tem of the new British Committee for Communist Unity is 34-year-old Michael McCreery.

November 12 - The Peking correspondent of the Yugoslav agency Tanyug reports on the meeting of the Chinese National People's Congress due to open in Peking 17 November, noting that the pre-congress atmosphere is dominated by the Sino-Soviet dispute. "The general impression among observers in Peking, based on a whole series of facts and documents made public there, is that the only alternative which might be accepted by the CCP is the full and unconditional capitulation of the other side."

November 14 - Peking People's Daily gives the full text of an article from the Malayan Monitor (London) commemorating the October Revolution anniversary which counterposed Lenin to the old and new revisionists. "Lenin did not say: 'we are surrounded by world imperialism, therefore we must not start an insurrection lest we provoke a world holocaust'. . . Lenin did not say of the revolutionary movements then in being: 'fold it up, you are creating tensions; a single fire may start a worldwide conflagration.'" It predicts: "The great Soviet land which saw the establishment of the first socialist state will shine again when the clouds have cleared."

November 15 - The Chinese press features a "joint statement by the All-China Youth Federation and the Ceylonese Federation of Communist and Progressive Youth Leagues" released in Peking on the 14th. NCNA says that the document, "ratified recently by the two federations" and signed by the vice president of the All-China federation and by two members of the Ceylon federation's Central Committee who "paid a friendly visit to China from 18 to 20 July at the invitation of the All-China Youth Federation," declares agreement by both on "further consolidating and developing the relations of friendship, unity, and cooperation between the two organizations, on the present international situation, and on major questions of the present world movement."

November 16 - The November issue of the North Vietnam Party's theoretical monthly Hoc Tap features a ponderous 5,000-word editorial entitled "Let Us Resolutely Defend the Revolutionary Principles of The Two Moscow Statements." Making the "attitude toward the Yugoslav revisionist clique" the touchstone of "Leninism or revisionism," the article denounces the persons who "are claiming that the analysis of the Tito clique by the 1960 statement is wrong. They eulogize the Tito clique. . . . Meanwhile they seek every means to isolate a number of true Marxist-Leninist parties To say that dogmatism is the main danger for the present international Communist movement is to contravene completely the spirit of the two Moscow statements."

November 16-17 - All Chinese papers on the 16th featured an NCNA report of the 15th to the effect that "the Soviet press is vigorously keeping up its anti-China campaign A total of more than 2,000 articles and other items have so far been published for the purpose. Since 27 October, Soviet papers have given great publicity to what they call Khrushchev's appeal to China to discontinue open polemics, but their wanton attacks on China continued as usual after the so-called appeal was made. Incomplete figures show that from 28 October to 10 November the Soviet press published more than 80 editorials, Soviet as well as foreign articles, 'reader's letters,' caricatures and other items, all attacking the Chinese leaders and the Chinese people." On the occasion of the 30th anniversary of the establishment of diplomatic relations between the USSR and the US, the Chinese press reports on the 17th, that the Soviet papers published "a good number of articles advocating alliance with the U.S. in opposition to China." They also report that "F.C. Barghoorn, a U.S. spy arrested by USSR security organs, was released without trial because of the 'concern' of high U.S. officials."

November 18 - A Cuban diplomatic mission arrives in Tirana, the Albanian capital, to open a Cuban Embassy. An Albanian Ambassador has been in Havana almost two years but the Cubans have hesitated lest such a move undermine Cuba's 'neutrality' in the Sino-Soviet dispute. Observers saw the present move as a "slap at Moscow."

November 19 - After a lapse of almost a month, the Chinese published the fifth in their drawn-out series of joint People's Daily/Red Flag commentaries pegged to the 14 July CPSU open letter: a 10,000-word article entitled "Two Different Lines on the Question of War and Peace." (see Chronology, September 6, 13, 26, and October 21 for earlier articles in series). It employs some of the most extreme formulations and insulting derision -- directed at Khrushchev by name -- yet to appear in any polemics.

The first section, "The Lessons of History," details the "pack of lies on the question of war and peace" spread by "the renegade Kautsky" and his fellow "revisionists of the Second International," in whose footsteps Khrushchev is following. The gist of the second section, headed "The Greatest Fraud," is in its opening sentence: "There is no bigger lie than the designation of the arch-enemy of world peace as a peace-loving angel.... Yet the leaders of the CPSU hold that the chief representatives of U.S. imperialism love peace." Turning to the CPSU open letter's question addressed to them: "Do they really think that all bourgeois governments lack all reason in everything they do?" the Chinese reply: "In a class society there is no reason that can transcend class." They conclude that:

- the U.S. imperialists have not become beautiful angels in spite of Khrushchev's Bible-reading and psalm-singing; they have not turned into compassionate Buddhas in spite of Khrushchev's prayers and incense-burning. However hard Khrushchev tries to serve the U. S. imperialists, ... they continue to slap Khrushchev in the face and reveal the bankruptcy of his ridiculous theories prettifying imperialism....

In the third section, "The Question of the Possibility of Preventing a New World War," the Chinese cite Mao, Lenin and Stalin (Stalin: "To eliminate the inevitability of war, it is necessary to abolish imperialism.") to show how wrong Khrushchev is. They go on to Mao's 1938 "famous thesis" that "political power grows out of the barrel of a gun," which the CPSU leaders have cited as evidence that China is "warlike": "slanders like yours were refuted" by Mao, who 25 years ago noted that "some people ridicule us as advocates of the 'omnipotence of war'" and answered "Yes, we are advocates of the omnipotence of revolutionary war; that is good, not bad; it is Marxist."

"What is wrong with Comrade Mao Tse-tung's remark? ... With their guns, the Chinese people have created a socialist political power. All except imperialists and their lackeys can readily understand that this is a fine thing...." The Chinese characterize as "nuclear fetishism and nuclear blackmail" the

Soviet charge that they are hoping for a "head-on clash" between the Soviet Union and the United States:

"Our answer is: no, friends. You had better stop your sensation-mongering calumny. The CCP is firmly opposed to a "head-on clash" between the Soviet Union and the United States, and not in words only. In deeds, too, it has worked hard to avert direct armed conflict between them. Examples of this are the Korean war against U.S. aggression, in which we fought side by side with the Korean comrades, and our struggle against the United States in the Taiwan Strait. We ourselves preferred to shoulder the heavy sacrifices necessary and stood in the first line of defense of the socialist camp so that the Soviet Union might stay on the second line. Have the leaders of the CPSU any sense of proletarian morality when they concoct such lies?"

The fourth section, "Fight or Capitulate," continues in the same vein. "Tit-for-tat struggle" is "the correct fighting policy put forward by the Chinese Communists."

"The CPSU leaders assert that a tit-for-tat struggle against imperialism will lead to international tension. Actually, Khrushchev's wrong approach to negotiations is itself harmful to negotiations. The more Khrushchev retreats before the imperialists and the more he begs, the more the appetite of the imperialists will grow. Khrushchev, who poses as the greatest devotee of negotiations in history, is always at unrequited lover and too often a laughing stock...."

The fifth section, "The Road in Defense of Peace and the Road Leading to War," is a brief summary of the features of the Chinese line on war and peace, juxtaposed against "the line pursued by the leaders of the CPSU (which) is diametrically opposed to our line, to the common line of all Marxist-Leninists and revolutionary people."

November 19 (cont.) - The UN General Assembly's Political Committee approved a Latin American resolution aimed at barring nuclear weapons from Latin America by a vote of 89 to 0, with 14 abstentions. After delegates of the USSR, Bulgaria, Czechoslovakia, Poland and Belorussia had spoken against the resolution, all members of the Communist bloc abstained in the voting -- except Albania and Rumania. This was said to be the first time that Rumania has ever acted in opposition to a Soviet position in the UN.

November 20 - The NYTimes carries a report by its Moscow correspondent Tanner who cites "informed sources" to the effect that Soviet and Chinese Communist representatives (members of the Chinese Embassy) have been "conducting consultations here with a view to holding a conference of their two parties on ideological issues." The meeting may be expected early next year in

Peking, "unless the consultations fail." Tanner goes on to say that "some observers here believe that the Russians agreed to another meeting with the Chinese because they wanted to avoid being blamed for bringing about a showdown at a world conference, not because they held any hope for success in the talks."

November 20 - Swedish CP daily Ny Dag carries article by prominent leader Landin demanding complete autonomy in "forming policy and judging tendencies, occurrences and events abroad." He categorically rejects the Moscow Declaration of 1960 and advocates that the CP be reorganized and reconstituted, possibly in the form of a "socialist peoples party." Urges that CP acknowledge democratic character of Swedish Government, repudiate utilization of the trade union movement for Party purposes, etc. (Note: report of this article received here was not specific on date; November 20 is assumed)

November 21 - The Chinese press reports that, following the return of Ceylon CP Chairman Wickremasinghe from Moscow, the Party's CC "issued a statement attacking the CCP and the Albanian Workers Party to keep time to the baton of the Soviet CP leaders" and took punitive measures against two of its Politbureau members. However, these measures "have met with opposition from many of its party organizations and members, as well as mass organizations." People's Daily devotes more than a page to "the full text of a statement issued by 10 members of the Ceylon CP CC on 27 September in refutation of" the CC statement of the 26th. (See Chronology, October 8, for earlier reference to the Ceylon CP resolution.)

November 22 - Rumanian Party/State boss Gheoghe Gheorghiu-Dej arrives in Belgrade at the head of a state delegation in response to a long-standing invitation to make a state visit. Welcoming the visit, Belgrade Politika anticipates that "questions of the international workers movement, international relations, and bilateral relations will dominate the talks " (in addition to the construction of the Iron Gates hydroelectric power system), and points out that "no disputed problems exist in Rumanian-Yugoslav relations that would make understanding and mutual cooperation impossible."

CRONOLOGIA -- DISENSIONES COMUNISTAS

No 17

9-22 Noviembre 1963

9 Noviembre: El "Zeri I Popullit", de Albania, lanza otra andanada en 7.000 palabras, "Otros actos de traición del renegado Tito", condenando también "la hostil acción escisionista del grupo de N. Krushchev, que apoya a la camarilla de Tito y sigue sus pasos".

10 Noviembre: "Akahata", órgano dominical de PC japonés, publica un artículo en forma de preguntas y respuestas expresando los puntos de vista del partido sobre "la llamada 'querella internacional' ". Afirma que "el PCJ toma una actitud independiente hacia las rencillas en el movimiento comunista internacional", y "no declara qué partido tiene la razón, quién tiene la razón ni a quién se debe apoyar para ventaja del PCJ". Sí contesta, no obstante, a "algunos (que) creen que el PC chino quiere la guerra" declarando que "creemos que semejante opinión está completamente infundada y que "el pueblo japonés... no podría creer que el PC y el gobierno de la RP china son belicistas", y expresa su desaprobación de "los dirigentes de ciertos partidos comunistas" que iniciaron "críticas abiertas de aquellos partidos que no habían estado de acuerdo con ellos" en la conferencia de Moscú de 1960 y precisamente las críticas al Partido de los Trabajadores albanés y el PC chino.

El artículo concluye sosteniendo que "una conferencia internacional debe celebrarse solo después que las condiciones necesarias han sido suficientemente creadas por la consulta previa entre partidos fraternos..." (El 12 fue reproducido el texto completo en toda la prensa de Pekín).

11 Noviembre: La prensa británica informa que "este fin de semana comenzó una campaña para derrocar la dirección del Partido Comunista de Gran Bretaña". Por correo fueron despachados a los principales trabajadores del partido 2.000 ejemplares de un manifiesto de 5 páginas firmado por 14 comunistas que dicen representar a "cuadros" en toda Gran Bretaña. El manifiesto critica acerbamente los puntos de vista y apoya a los chinos, llamando a todos los miembros del partido a "derrotar a los revisionistas" en la dirigencia del partido y establecer un PC "genuino". Acusa a Krushchev de "abierta traición" y ataca al secretario general Gollan así como al director Matthews del "Daily Worker" por apoyarlo. Michael McCreery, de 34 años, es el secretario interino del nuevo Comité Británico por la Unidad Comunista.

12 Noviembre: El corresponsal en Pekín de la agencia yugoslava Tanyug informa sobre la reunión del Congreso Nacional del Pueblo Chino a iniciarse en Pekín de noviembre, apuntando que la atmósfera precongresal está dominada por la querella chino-soviética. "La impresión general entre los observadores en Pekín, a base de toda una serie de documentos dados allí a la publicidad, es que la única alternativa que sería tal vez aceptada por el PC chino es la capitulación completa e incondicional del lado opuesto".

14 Noviembre: El "Diario del Pueblo" de Pekín publica el texto completo de un artículo del "Malayan Monitor" de Londres en conmemoración

del aniversario de la Revolución de octubre contraponiendo a Lenin a los antiguos y los nuevos revisionistas, "Lenin no dijo: 'estamos cercados por el imperialismo mundial, no podemos pues lanzar una insurrección so pena de provocar un holocausto mundial'.... Lenin no dijo del movimiento revolucionario entonces en ciernes: 'a clausurarlo, estáis creando tensiones; un solo incendio puede iniciar una conflagración mundial' ". Predice: "La gran tierra soviética que vio el establecimiento del primer estado socialista brillará otra vez cuando se hayan disipado las nubes".

15 Noviembre: La prensa china destaca una "declaración conjunta de la Federación Juvenil de Toda China y la Federación Ceilanesa de Ligas Juveniles Comunistas y Progresistas" hecha pública el día 14 en Pekín. La Agencia Nueva China dice que el documento, "ratificado recientemente por ambas federaciones" y suscrito por el vicepresidente de la federación de toda China y por dos miembros del comité central de la federación ceilanesa que "hicieron una visita amistosa a China del 18 al 20 de julio a invitación de la Federación Juvenil de Toda China", declara el acuerdo de ambos sobre la "ulterior consolidación y desenvolvimiento de las relaciones de unidad, amistad y cooperación entre ambas organizaciones, sobre la actual situación internacional y sobre cuestiones principales del actual movimiento mundial".

16 Noviembre: La edición de noviembre de "Hoc Tap", mensuario teórico del partido de Vietnam del Norte, destaca un pesado editorial de 5.000 palabras bajo el epígrafe de "Defendamos resueltamente los principios revolucionarios de las dos Declaraciones de Moscú". Haciendo de la "actitud hacia la camarilla revisionista yugoslava" la piedra de toque del "leninismo o el revisionismo", el artículo condena a las personas que "están pretendiendo que el análisis de la camarilla de Tito en la Declaración de 1960 está equivocado. Elogian la camarilla de Tito... Entretanto buscan todos los medios de aislar los verdaderos partidos marxistas-leninistas... Decir que el dogmatismo es el principal peligro para el actual movimiento comunista internacional es contravenir completamente el espíritu de las dos Declaraciones de Moscú".

16 - 17 Noviembre: Toda la prensa china destacó el 16 un informe de la Agencia Nueva China del 15 en el sentido de que "la prensa soviética está vigorosamente sosteniendo su campaña antichina... Con tal fin un total de más de 2.000 artículos y otras piezas han sido publicados hasta la fecha. Desde el 27 de octubre, los diarios soviéticos han dado gran publicidad a lo que denominan el llamamiento de Krushev a China a suspender las polémicas abiertas, pero sus ataques desenfrenados contra China continuaron como siempre después de hecho el sedicente llamamiento. Cifras incompletas comprueban que del 28 de octubre al 10 de noviembre la prensa soviética publicó más de 80 editoriales, artículos soviéticos así como extranjeros, 'cartas del lector', caricaturas y otras piezas, todas atacando a los dirigentes chinos y al pueblo chino". En ocasión del 30° aniversario del establecimiento de relaciones diplomáticas entre la URSS y los EE.UU., informa la prensa china el 17, los diarios soviéticos publicaron "un buen número de artículos abogando por la alianza con los EE.UU. en oposición a China". Informan además que "F.C. Barghoorn, espía norteamericano detenido por los órganos de seguridad de la URSS, fue puesto en libertad sin ser procesado debido a la 'inquietud' de altos funcionarios norteamericanos".

18 Noviembre: Una misión diplomática cubana llega a Tirana, capital de Albania, para inaugurar una embajada cubana. Un embajador albanés ha estado hace casi dos años en La Habana, pero los cubanos han dudado por temor a que una acción semejante socave la 'neutralidad' de Cuba en la querrela chino-soviética. Los observadores consideraron este paso de ahora como un "bofetón a Moscú".

19 Noviembre: Luego de un lapso de casi un mes los chinos publicaron el quinto en su prolongada serie de comentarios conjuntos del "Diario del Pueblo" y "Bandera Roja" con base a la carta abierta del PCUS de 14 de julio, un artículo de 10.000 palabras titulado "Dos líneas divergentes sobre la cuestión de la guerra o la paz". (Vea la Cronología en 6, 13 y 26 de septiembre y 21 de octubre, en cuanto a los artículos anteriores de la serie). Emplea algunas de las formulaciones más extremas y la burla más insultante -- dirigida a Krushev por su nombre -- que haya aparecido hasta la fecha en polémica alguna.

La primera sección, "Las lecciones de la historia," detalla "el montón de mentiras sobre la cuestión de la guerra y la paz" difundidas por "el renegado Kautsky" y sus co "revisionistas de la Segunda Internacional", cuyos pasos sigue Krushev. La esencia de la segunda sección, titulada "El mayor fraude", está en su oración primera: "No hay mentira mayor que la designación del archienemigo de la paz mundial como ángel amante de la paz... Sin embargo, los dirigentes del PCUS mantienen que los principales representantes del imperialismo norteamericano aman la paz". En respuesta a la pregunta dirigídale en la carta abierta del PCUS, "Se imaginan que los gobiernos burgueses todos están totalmente desprovistos de razón en todo cuanto hacen?" contestan los chinos: "En una sociedad de clases no hay razón que pueda trascender la clase". Concluyen que:

Los imperialistas norteamericanos no se han convertido en hermosos ángeles pese a la lectura de la Biblia y el canto de salmos por parte de Krushev; no se han convertido en Budas compasivos pese a las preces y las ofrendas de incienso de Krushev. Pese a todos los esfuerzos de Krushev de servir a los imperialistas norteamericanos... éstos siguen abofeteando a Krushev y revelando la ban-carrota de las ridículas teorías de éste embelleciendo el imperialismo...

En la tercera sección, "La cuestión de la posibilidad de prevenir una nueva guerra mundial", los chinos citan a Mao, Lenin y Stalin (Stalin: "Para eliminar la inevitabilidad de la guerra, es preciso abolir el imperialismo") para demostrar cómo se equivoca Krushev. Pasan luego a la "famosa tesis" de Mao de 1938 de que "el poder político crece del cañón de un arma de fuego", la cual los dirigentes del PCUS han citado como prueba de que China es "belicista": "calumnias como las de ustedes fueron refutadas por Mao, el cual hace 25 años apuntó que "algunos nos ridiculizan como propugnadores de la 'omnipotencia de la guerra'" y replicó que "Sí, somos propugnadores de la omnipotencia de la guerra revolucionaria; eso es bueno, no malo; es marxista".

"¿Qué tiene de malo la observación de Mao Tse-tung? ..."
Con sus armas el pueblo chino ha creado un poder político socialista.

Todos menos los imperialistas y sus lacayos pueden fácilmente comprender que eso es la gran cosa..." Los chinos denominan "fetichismo nuclear y chantaje nuclear" la acusación soviética de que están contando con un "choque directo" entre la Unión Soviética y los Estados Unidos:

"Nuestra respuesta es: No, amigos. Mejor dejen su calumnia sensacionalista. El PC chino se opone firmemente a un 'choque directo' entre la Unión Soviética y los Estados Unidos, y no en palabras solamente. En los hechos también ha hecho ardua labor por evitar el conflicto armado directo entre ellos. Ejemplos de esto han sido la guerra coreana contra la agresión de EE.UU., en la que luchamos hombro a hombro con los camaradas coreanos, y nuestra lucha contra los EE.UU. en el Estrecho de Taiwán. Nosotros mismo preferimos arrostrar los fuertes sacrificios necesarios y estuvimos en la primera línea de defensa del campo socialista de modo que la Unión Soviética pudiera permanecer en la segunda línea. ¿Tienen los dirigentes del PCUS sentido alguno de la moral proletaria cuando fabrican semejantes mentiras?"

La cuarta sección, "Pelear o capitular", prosigue en la misma cuerda. "La lucha de ojo por ojo" es la "correcta política de lucha propuesta por los comunistas chinos".

"Los dirigentes del PCUS afirman que la lucha de ojo por ojo contra el imperialismo llevará a la tensión internacional. En realidad, la actitud equivocada de Krushev hacia las negociaciones es en sí nociva a las negociaciones. Cuanto más Krushev ceda ante los imperialistas y cuanto más implore, tanto más crecerá el apetito de los imperialistas. Krushev, que posa como el mayor devoto de las negociaciones en la historia, es siempre amante no correspondido y muchas veces objeto de burlas..."

La quinta sección, "El camino en defensa de la paz y el camino que lleva a la guerra", es un breve resumen de los puntos sobresalientes de la línea china sobre la guerra y la paz, yuxtapuestos contra "la línea perseguida por los dirigentes del PCUS (que) es diametralmente opuesta a nuestra línea, a la línea común de todos los marxistas-leninistas y gentes revolucionarias".

19 Noviembre (cont.): El Comité Político de la Asamblea General de la ONU aprobó una resolución latinoamericana tendiente a proscribir de Latinoamérica las armas nucleares, por voto de 89 a cero, con 14 abstenciones. Luego que los delegados de la URSS, Bulgaria, Checoslovaquia, Polonia y Belorussia hubieron intervenido contra la resolución, todos los miembros del bloque se abstuvieron de votar -- salvo Albania y Rumania. Se dijo que esta había sido la primera vez que Rumania había actuado en oposición a una posición soviética en la ONU.

20 Noviembre: En "New York Times" publica una información de Tanner, su corresponsal en Moscú, que cita a "fuentes enteradas" en el sentido de que representantes comunistas soviéticos y chinos (miembros de

la embajada china) han estado "llevando a cabo aquí consultaciones en vista a celebrar una conferencia de ambos partidos sobre cuestiones ideológicas". La reunión puede esperarse a principios del próximo año en Pekín, "a menos que fracasen las consultaciones". Tanner continúa diciendo que "algunos observadores aquí creen que los rusos aceptaron otra reunión con los chinos porque querían evitar que se les culpara de producir un encuentro decisivo en una conferencia mundial y no porque tuvieran esperanza alguna de éxito en las conversaciones".

20 Noviembre: El diario del PC sueco "Ny Dag" publica un artículo por el prominente dirigente Landin exigiendo completa autonomía en "la formulación de política y el juicio de tendencias, acontecimientos y sucesos en el extranjero". Categoricamente rechaza la Declaración de Moscú de 1960 y aboga porque se reorganice y se reconstituya el PC, posiblemente en forma de "partido socialista del pueblo". Pide que el PC reconozca el carácter democrático del gobierno sueco, repudia el empleo del movimiento sindical para fines del partido, etc. (Nota: la información sobre este artículo no precisaba la fecha del mismo; se presume ser el 20 de noviembre).

21 Noviembre: La prensa china informa que después del regreso de Moscú del presidente Wickremasinghe del PC de Ceilán, el CC del partido "expidió una declaración atacando el PC chino y el Partido de los Trabajadores de Albania para estar al compás de la batuta de los dirigentes del PC soviético" y tomó medidas punitivas contra dos de los miembros de su politburó. No obstante, dichas medidas "han encarado la oposición de gran número de las organizaciones y miembros del partido así como organizaciones de masa". El "Diario del Pueblo" dedica más de una plana al "texto íntegro de una declaración hecha pública por 10 miembros del CC del PC ceilanés el 27 de septiembre refutando" la declaración del CC del 26. (Vea Cronología, 8 octubre, con referencia a la resolución del PC ceilanés).

22 Noviembre: El jefe del partido y el estado rumanos, Gheorghe Gheorghiu-Dej, llega a Belgrado encabezando una delegación de estado en respuesta a una invitación de hace tiempo en ese sentido. En bienvenida a la visita, el diario "Politika" de Belgrado predice que "cuestiones del movimiento obrero internacional, relaciones internacionales y relaciones bilaterales dominarán las conversaciones" (además de la construcción del sistema hidroeléctrico de Puertas de Hierro) y apunta que "no existen problemas en disputa en las relaciones rumano-yugoslavas que imposibilitaran la comprensión y la cooperación mutua."

CHRONOLOGIE -- DISSENSIONS COMMUNISTES

Numéro 17

9 - 22 novembre 1963

9 novembre: Le Zeri i Popullit albanais publie une nouvelle tirade de 7 000 mots "Actes de trahison additionnels par le renégat Tito" dénonçant également "l'activité hostile du groupe de Khrouchtchev, qui soutient la bande de Tito et la suit sur ses traces".

10 novembre: L'hebdomadaire du dimanche du P.C. japonais Akahata publie un article anonyme sous forme de questions et de réponses qui donne l'opinion du parti sur "la soi-disant dispute internationale". Il affirme que le "P.C. japonais prend une attitude indépendante à l'égard des disputes dans le mouvement communiste international", et "ne déclare pas quel parti a raison, qui a raison, ou qui devrait être soutenu à l'avantage du P.C. japonais". Toutefois, il répond bien à "certaines gens qui prétendent que le P.C. chinois désire la guerre". En déclarant "Nous croyons qu'une opinion de ce genre est totalement sans fondement", et que "le peuple japonais... ne peut croire que le gouvernement de la République populaire de la Chine et le parti communiste soient belliqueux", et il exprime sa désapprobation "aux leaders de certains partis communistes" qui se sont livrés "à une critique ouverte de ceux des partis qui n'étaient pas d'accord avec eux" à la conférence de Moscou de 1960, et notamment avec les critiques du parti ouvrier albanais et du P.C. chinois.

L'article conclut en affirmant "qu'une conférence internationale ne devrait être réunie qu'après que les conditions nécessaires soient suffisamment assurées au moyen de consultations préalables entre les partis fraternels..." (Le texte fut reproduit en entier dans tous les journaux de Pékin du 12.)

11 novembre: La presse britannique fait savoir "qu'une campagne pour renverser les leaders du P.C. de Grande-Bretagne a débuté au cours du weekend". Deux mille copies d'un manifeste de 5 pages signé par 14 communistes qui prétendent représenter "les cadres" en Grande-Bretagne furent adressées aux principaux travailleurs du parti. Il critique violemment les opinions soviétiques et soutient les Chinois; lance un appel à tous les membres du parti pour "vaincre les révisionnistes" parmi les leaders du parti, et pour créer un parti communiste "véritable". Il accuse Khrouchtchev "de trahison véritable" et attaque le secrétaire-général Gollan, et l'éditeur Matthews du Daily Worker pour l'avoir soutenu. Le secrétaire intérimaire du nouveau comité britannique pour l'unité communiste est Michel McCreery, âgé de 34 ans.

12 novembre: Le correspondant pékinois de l'Agence yougoslave Tanyug fait rapport au sujet d'une réunion du Congrès populaire national chinois qui doit s'ouvrir à Pékin le 17 novembre et souligne que l'atmosphère avant le congrès est dominée par la dispute sino-soviétique. "L'impression générale parmi les observateurs à Pékin, basée sur toute une série de faits et de documents rendus publics ici, est que la seule alternative qui puisse être acceptée par le P.C. chinois serait une capitulation complète et sans conditions du parti opposé".

14 novembre: Le Quotidien du peuple de Pékin donne le contexte com-

plet d'un article du Malayan Monitor (Londres) commémorant l'anniversaire de la Révolution d'octobre et opposant Lénine aux nouveaux et aux anciens révisionnistes. "Lénine n'a pas dit: Nous sommes entourés par l'impérialisme mondial, par conséquent nous ne devons pas commencer une insurrection pour ne pas provoquer de holocauste mondial... Lénine n'a pas dit des mouvements révolutionnaires qui existaient alors: 'repliez-vous, vous allez créer des tensions; un seul incendie risque de donner lieu à une conflagration mondiale' ". Lénine a prédit: "La grande terre soviétique qui a vu la création du premier Etat socialiste brillera de nouveau lorsque les nuages se seront dissipés".

15 novembre: La presse chinoise publie "une déclaration commune de la Fédération pan-chinoise de la jeunesse et de la Fédération ceylanaise des ligues de jeunesse communistes et progressives" donnée à Pékin le 14. L'Agence de presse de la Chine nouvelle déclare que ce document "ratifié récemment par deux fédérations" et signé par le vice-président de la Fédération pan-chinoise et par deux membres du Comité central de la fédération ceylanaise qui "ont rendu une visite amicale à la Chine du 18 au 20 juillet à l'invitation de la Fédération pan-chinoise de la jeunesse", déclare que les deux organisations sont d'accord "pour continuer à consolider et à développer les relations d'amitié, d'unité et de coopération entre ces deux organisations, au sujet de la situation internationale présente et au sujet des questions principales intéressant à l'heure actuelle le mouvement mondial".

16 novembre: Le numéro de novembre de Hoc Tap, publication mensuelle théorique du P.C. du Nord Viet-nam, donne un éditorial de 5 000 mots intitulé "Défendons résolument les principes révolutionnaires des deux déclarations de Moscou". Faisant "de l'attitude envers la clique révisionniste yougoslave" la pierre angulaire du "léninisme ou révisionnisme", l'article condamne les personnes qui "prétendent que l'analyse donnée par la déclaration de 1960 de la clique de Tito... entretemps, ils cherchent à isoler par tous les moyens un nombre de partis marxistes-léninistes véritables... disent que le dogmatisme constitue le danger principal pour le mouvement communiste international actuel et de se mettre entièrement à l'encontre de l'esprit des deux déclarations de Moscou."

16 - 17 novembre: Tous les journaux chinois du 16 donnent un article de l'Agence de presse de la Chine nouvelle daté du 15 qui déclare que "la presse soviétique attise vigoureusement sa campagne anti-chinoise ... un nombre total de plus de 2 000 articles et autres publications ont été publiés à cet effet. Depuis le 27 octobre, les journaux soviétiques ont donné une publicité considérable à ce qu'ils appellent l'appel de Khrouchtchev à la Chine pour cesser les polémiques ouvertes, mais leurs attaques sans fondement contre la Chine se sont produites comme d'habitude après que le soi-disant appel ait été fait. La presse soviétique publia plus de 80 éditoriaux, des articles soviétiques et étrangers, des 'lettres de lecteurs', des caricatures, etc., tous attaquant les leaders chinois et le peuple chinois". A l'occasion du 30^e anniversaire de l'établissement des relations diplomatiques entre l'Union soviétique et les Etats-Unis, la presse chinoise a fait savoir le 17 que les journaux soviétiques ont publié "un bon nombre d'articles préconisant l'alliance avec les Etats-Unis en opposition à la Chine". Ils font savoir également que "F.C. Baré

hoorn, espion américain arrêté par les organismes de sécurité de l'Union Soviétique, a été relâché sans jugement en raison du "souci" des hauts fonctionnaires américains".

18 novembre: Une mission diplomatique cubaine est arrivée à Tirana, capitale de l'Albanie, pour y ouvrir une ambassade cubaine. Un ambassadeur albanais se trouvait à La Havane depuis presque deux ans, mais les Cubains avaient hésité pour que cette mesure ne sape pas la neutralité cubaine dans la dispute sino-soviétique. Les observateurs considèrent que la décision actuelle constitue une "giffle donnée à Moscou".

19 novembre: Après un délai de près d'un mois, les Chinois ont publié le 5^e article de leur série donnée en commun par le Quotidien du peuple et le Drapeau rouge, article contenant des commentaires sur la lettre ouverte du P.C. de l'Union Soviétique datée du 14 juillet. L'article de 10 000 mots est intitulé: Deux lignes différentes sur la question de guerre et de paix". (Voir Chronologies, 6, 13 et 26 septembre et 21 octobre, sur les articles précédents de cette série). Le langage le plus extrême y est employé ainsi que des plaisanteries insultantes, dirigées contre Khrouchtchev personnellement et à un degré encore jamais atteint au cours d'une polémique.

La première section, "Les leçons de l'histoire", donne en détail "les fables de mensonges sur la question de guerre et de paix" répandus par "le renégat Kautsky" et par ses camarades "révisionnistes de la 2^e Internationale" dont Khrouchtchev emboîte le pas. L'essentiel de cette deuxième partie, intitulée "La grande fraude", est contenu dans sa phrase d'introduction: "Il n'y a pas de mensonge plus grand que de qualifier d'ange pacifique cet archienemi de la paix mondiale... Cependant, les leaders du P.C.U.S. prétendent que les principaux représentants de l'impérialisme américain sont pacifiques". Reprenant alors la question de la lettre ouverte du P.C.U.S. qui leur fut adressée: "Pensent-ils réellement que tous les gouvernements bourgeois manquent de raison dans tout ce qu'ils font?" Les Chinois répondent: "Dans une société de classe il n'y a pas de raison qui l'emporte sur la classe". Ils concluent que:

... les impérialistes américains ne sont pas devenus des anges magnifiques en dépit de la lecture de la bible et des chants de psaumes auxquels se livre Khrouchtchev; ils ne sont pas devenus des bouddhas pleins de compassion en dépit des prières que dit Khrouchtchev et de l'encens qu'il brûle. Khrouchtchev aura beau s'évertuer à servir les impérialistes américains... ceux-ci continueront à lui donner des gifles et à faire connaître l'échec de ses théories ridicules qui embellissent l'impérialisme...

Dans la 3^e section, "La question de la possibilité d'empêcher une nouvelle guerre mondiale", les Chinois citent Mao, Lenine et Staline (Staline: "Pour éliminer l'inévitabilité de la guerre, il est nécessaire d'abolir l'impérialisme") dans le but de montrer à quel point Khrouchtchev a tort. Ils reviennent à la "thèse fameuse" de Mao de 1938 qui veut "que le pouvoir politique émerge d'un tonneau de poudre", que les leaders du P.C.U.S. ont cité comme preuve que la Chine était "belliqueuse": "des calomnies comme les vôtres

ont été réfutées" par Mao qui, il y a 25 ans, soulignait que "quelques gens nous tournent au ridicule disant que nous prêchons 'l'omnipotence de la guerre' " et il répondit: "Oui, nous prêchons l'omnipotence de la guerre révolutionnaire; cela est bon et non pas mauvais; cela est marxiste".

"Qu'y a-t-il de mauvais dans la remarque du camarade Mao Tse-tung?... Avec leurs armes, les Chinois ont créé une puissance politique socialiste. Tous à l'exception des impérialistes et de leurs laquais peuvent se rendre compte facilement que cela est une bonne chose..." Les Chinois qualifient de "fétichisme nucléaire et chantage nucléaire" l'accusation soviétique selon laquelle ils espèrent qu'il y aura "une collision frontale" entre l'Union Soviétique et les Etats-Unis:

"Notre réponse est: Non, camarades. Vous feriez mieux d'arrêter vos calomnies à sensation. Le P.C. chinois est fermement opposé à des "collisions frontales" entre l'Union Soviétique et les Etats-Unis, et non seulement en paroles. En action également, il a travaillé pour éviter tout conflit armé direct entre ces deux pays. Comme exemple, il y a la guerre de Corée contre l'agression américaine dans laquelle nous avons combattu côte à côte avec les camarades coréens, ainsi que notre lutte contre les Etats-Unis dans le détroit de Taiwan. Personnellement nous avons préféré d'assumer les lourds sacrifices qui étaient nécessaires et nous nous sommes tenues en première ligne de défense du camp socialiste afin que l'Union Soviétique puisse rester en deuxième ligne. Les leaders du P.C. de l'Union Soviétique ont-ils aucun sens de moralité prolétarienne lorsqu'ils fabriquent des mensonges pareils?"

La 4^e section, "Combattre ou capituler", continue sur le même ton. "Lutte coup pour coup" est "la politique de combat correcte préconisée par les communistes chinois".

"Les leaders du P.C.U.S. affirment qu'une lutte coup pour coup contre l'impérialisme conduirait à une tension internationale. En réalité, la position erronée de Khrouchtchev à l'égard des négociations est elle-même nuisible pour les négociations. Plus Khrouchtchev battra en retraite devant les impérialistes et plus il mendiera, plus l'appétit des impérialistes augmentera. Khrouchtchev, qui se pose en tant que l'homme le plus dévoué aux négociations de l'histoire, reste toujours un amant inassouvi et trop souvent un objet de risée..."

La 5^e section, "La route pour la défense de la paix et la route menant à la guerre", est un résumé succinct des caractères principaux de la ligne chinoise sur la guerre et sur la paix, comparés à "la ligne poursuivie par les leaders du P.C.U.S. qui diamétralement opposée à notre ligne, à la ligne commune de tous les marxistes-léninistes et des gens révolutionnaires".

19 novembre (suite): Le Comité politique de l'Assemblée générale des Nations unies a approuvé une résolution de l'Amérique Latine

tendant à interdire les armes nucléaires en Amérique Latine par un vote de 89 à 0, avec 14 abstentions. Après que les délégués de l'Union Soviétique, de la Bulgarie, de la Tchécoslavie, de la Pologne et de la Belo-Russie eussent parlé contre la résolution, tous les membres du bloc communiste s'abstinrent de voter à l'exception de l'Albanie et de la Roumanie. Il a été dit que c'était pour la première fois que la Roumanie ait agi en opposition à l'Union Soviétique aux Nations unies.

20 novembre: Le New York Times donne un article de son correspondant à Moscou Tanner qui cite "des sources informées" selon lesquelles les représentants communistes soviétiques et chinois (membres de l'ambassade chinoise) auraient eu "des consultations à Moscou dans le but d'organiser une conférence de leurs deux partis sur les questions idéologiques". La réunion se tiendrait au début de l'année prochaine à Pékin "à moins que les consultations n'aboutissent à un échec". Tanner ajoute que "certains observateurs estiment que les Soviets ont accepté une nouvelle réunion avec les Chinois parce qu'ils veulent éviter le blâme pour avoir provoqué une discussion ouverte lors d'une conférence mondiale et non pas parce qu'ils aient espoir que ces entretiens puissent réussir".

20 novembre: Ny Dag, Quotidien du P.C. suédois, publie un article du leader en vue Landin demandant une autonomie complète dans "l'élaboration de la politique et dans les jugements portés sur les tendances, les faits et les événements à l'étranger". Il rejette catégoriquement la déclaration de Moscou de 1960 et demande que le parti communiste soit réorganisé et reconstitué, sous la forme sans doute "de partis socialistes véritables". Il insiste pour que le P.C. reconnaisse le caractère démocratique du gouvernement suédois, qu'il répudie l'usage des mouvements syndicalistes pour les besoins du parti, etc. (Le rapport concernant cet article reçu ici ne spécifie pas la date; la date présumée est le 20 novembre).

21 novembre: La presse chinoise fait savoir qu'à la suite du retour de Moscou du président du P.C. du Ceylan Wickremasinghe, le Comité central du parti "a fait paraître une déclaration attaquant le P.C. chinois et le parti travailliste albanais afin de conserver la mesure sous la direction des leaders du P.C. soviétique" et qu'il prit des mesures de représailles contre deux des membres de son politburo. Cependant, ces mesures "se sont heurtées à l'opposition d'un grand nombre d'organisations et de membres du parti, ainsi qu'à celle des organisations de masse". Le Quotidien du peuple consacre plus d'une page "au texte complet de la déclaration publié par 10 membres du C.C. du P.C. du Ceylan le 27 septembre où il réfute la déclaration du C.C. du 26". (Voir Chronologie, 8 octobre, au sujet des références précédentes à la résolution du P.C. de Ceylan).

22 novembre: Gheoghe Gheorghiu-Dej, chef du parti et de l'Etat roumains, est arrivé à Belgrade à la tête d'une délégation d'Etat répondant à une invitation déjà ancienne de faire une visite d'Etat. Saluant la visite, Politika de Belgrade prévoit que "les questions du mouvement international ouvrier, des relations internationales, et des relations bilatérales domineront les pourparlers". En plus de la question de construction du système hydroélectrique des Portes de fer", et souligne que "aucun différend n'existe dans les relations

entre la Roumanie et la Yougoslavie qui serait de nature à rendre impossible la coopération et la compréhension réciproques entre les deux pays".

715 (not for FE). Covertly Promoting Greater Stability in
Free-World Governments

25X1C10b



BACKGROUND: Recent coups d'etat in Africa, Asia, and Latin America have focused world attention upon an important phenomenon in the underdeveloped countries of the world: instability in government has come to be a sort of vicious circle. It is one of the causes of the poverty and ignorance of the masses, and, at the same time, it encourages and facilitates violent action on the part of irresponsible groups, including the frequent seizure of power by the military.

We define a stable government as one that can assure its citizens and interested nationals of other governments that its policies will not change suddenly or radically over an extended period of time. Totalitarian governments achieve a maximum degree of domestic stability by the arbitrary application of force. Democratic, representative governments seek to achieve a sufficient degree of stability through popular support and by conciliating the oftentimes conflicting demands and interests of all sectors of the population.

The fact of instability has come to be more and more the number-one problem of the underdeveloped countries of the world: and the former colonies of Asia and Africa, now independent nations, have only served to swell the ranks of the chronically unstable governments. The countries of Latin America, having been independent for 150 years, have a long history of instability. In the matter of military coups alone, the casual observer has the impression that Latin American nations prefer to solve the problem of presidential succession violently rather than constitutionally. Indeed, during the 34-year period beginning in 1930 and ending in 1963, there were 103 changes of heads of state in Latin America by violent or illegal means. In Mexico, the only exception to the general rule during this period, presidents have been elected and inaugurated in an orderly manner and according to the Constitution of 1917, the oldest constitution in force today in Latin America. If Romulo Betancourt is able to finish his constitutional term as President of Venezuela, it will be the first time in the history of that country that a legally elected president has been able to do so.

Dictatorship, or the seizure of power by military force has not provided the answer to stability, especially in a world increasingly convinced that sovereignty resides in the people. The dictator at first offers advantages in efficiency and promise of stable government. The so-called oligarchy of many countries of Latin America has traditionally had recourse to the dictator to protect itself against the masses. But they

forget the implacable process by which, according to Lord Acton, "Power tends to corrupt, and absolute power corrupts absolutely." In addition, and by a logical dialectic, dictatorship generates an opposition composed of many decent elements, both in and out of the country, which becomes more and more popular, more and more respected. The danger is not only that disruption accompanies the removal of a dictator, but that a respectable opposition may be captured by Communists and converted into a Castro-type force. The succeeding government may bring something far worse than the repressive administration of the military dictator it overthrew.

Just as Simon Bolivar saw clearly the need for a balance between libertad y orden, the desire for stability should not be translated into an emphasis on order to the detriment of liberty.

Few of the countries in the underdeveloped areas have been free from other chronic types of violence, such as: mass demonstrations against the government; deliberate attempts to provoke the police to use clubs, tear gas, sabers, and even firearms; attempts by organized labor to control the government through work stoppages or general strikes; seizure of private lands by armed peasants; indiscriminate planting of bombs in public places; senseless destruction of the property of both foreign-owned and domestic enterprises; the constant threat of nationalization that hangs over many foreign-owned properties; and the continual plotting by elements of the military for the illegal seizure of the apparatus of government.

United States concern over instability in governments in Latin America was underscored by President Kennedy in the address which he delivered on 18 November 1963 before the Inter-American Press Association at its meeting in Miami Beach. Giving voice to some long overdue truths about the Alliance for Progress, he said:

"Nor can the failure of some to meet the goals of the charter be placed wholly on the shortcomings of the Alliance. No amount of external resources, no stabilization of commodity prices, no new Inter-American institutions, can bring progress to nations which do not have political stability and determined leadership. No series of hemispheric agreements or elaborate machinery can help those who lack internal discipline; who are unwilling to make sacrifices, and renounce privileges. No one who sends his money abroad, who is unwilling to invest in the future of his own country, can blame others for the deluge which threatens to overcome him."

The causes of instability should not be sought exclusively in the poverty, hunger, ignorance, or generally depressed conditions of the masses. These are as much a result as a cause of instability. Poverty leads to dissatisfaction, agitation, disorder and violence. In turn, chronic instability alienates

foreign and domestic capital, stifles initiative, makes for corruption in government and inefficiency in industry and agriculture. A vicious circle is set in motion.

Nor is a high per capita income such as in Argentina and Venezuela, any guarantee of stability. Venezuela has one of the highest per capita incomes in Latin America but the indiscipline of extremist groups threatens the stability of this government perhaps more than anywhere else in the Western Hemisphere.

Even so, in most parts of the world, the submerged masses are easy marks for agitators and demagogues who promise land to the landless, bread to the hungry. Injustice has come to be so much the rule rather than the exception that there is a widespread tendency for groups to prefer direct action to legal appeal. Regardless of the righteousness of their cause, they have no faith in the governing authorities. Thus, if the students of a university can be persuaded that the government is not giving their school enough money, or that the rector is incompetent, or that they should have to pay only half-fare on all public transportation, or that certain professors should be fired, -- then they will go on strike and physically occupy the campus until their demands are satisfied. Sometimes the students are justified and sometimes they are not. But where stability -- law and order -- suffers is that most issues are never legally decided one way or the other.

A clever Communist agitator may be able to persuade a community of half-starving peasants to seize the lands and stock of a wealthier, more progressive farmer. The needs of the many are so real and the possessions of the few so obvious that it is difficult in such cases for those in authority to take measures necessary to maintain public order. This situation has brought about an attitude of tolerance toward arbitrary and illegal acts, which, when generalized, signifies the virtual abdication of the rule of law.

Where the state permits one group to break the law because it has some semblance of moral right on its side, other groups are encouraged to do the same thing though they may have no moral justification whatever. The apparatus of justice in a given country is normally concerned with whether an act is objectively legal or illegal, not whether it is subjectively moral or immoral. To argue, as many presumably intelligent Latin Americans do, that it is moral, therefore should be legal, for the needy to take what they need by force is to encourage a subjective, ad hoc interpretation of objective, positive law. In such an atmosphere, more and more people will tend to take the law into their own hands, which will result in a breakdown in law and order, an end to stability.

The advantages of stability among democratic governments thus become self-evident. Countries with stable governments will have fewer problems of public order and hence less danger

from the inroads of Communist subversion. They will offer attractive investment conditions for foreign and domestic capital. They will generally have an expanding economy and a high growth rate in the national income. The people and their leaders will tend to be friendly because, being more prosperous, they will be less envious of others and less liable to be infected by the virus of nationalism.

25X1C10b


25X1C10b

Approved For Release 1999/08/24 : CIA-RDP78-03061A000200040003-4

Approved For Release 1999/08/24 : CIA-RDP78-03061A000200040003-4

716 EE,WE. Poland: Hard-Line Trend

25X1C10b



BACKGROUND: Party chief Gomulka since his advent to power in 1956 has more or less unswervingly pursued his own peculiar policy line during an era of tortuous change of direction among other Communist states in East Europe. His goal for Poland is a national Communist welfare state with limited individual liberties and limited free enterprise. He recognizes that the Poles could be brought to accept such a system only through slow persuasion but he is determined that the system will be ultimately accepted by them. In following this road he has fluctuated between responsiveness to popular pressures for greater freedom, particularly freedom of expression, and insistence by hard-line Communists on stricter regime controls.

Gomulka was swept into his present position in 1956 by the impact of an anti-Russian and revisionist (at least potentially anti-Communist), nationalist surge. He was accepted, despite initial Soviet disapproval, by other Polish Party leaders as the only alternative to internal chaos, and the threat of consequent Soviet military intervention. Out of the historic meeting of the Central Committee of the United Polish Workers Party (PZPR) in the autumn of 1956 came relaxation of police rule, an end to forced collectivization of agriculture, reaffirmation of the right of peasants to own land and a truce with the Roman Catholic church. These reforms earned for Poland the reputation of being the relatively most liberal country in the Soviet Bloc. However, -- as liberalization was gradually curtailed over the following years -- it has become evident that much of the relaxation was owed to the weaknesses and not to the designs of the Party leadership. Currently the Gomulka regime appears to have accelerated the curtailment of what still remains of the "October gains" and finds itself now moving counter to new trends toward liberalization among other East European states of the Soviet Bloc. While there is no proof that this hardened policy comes from other than party leader Gomulka, it may be attributable in part to diehard dogmatists who Gomulka has reinstated in certain key posts. At the same time, unfulfilled promises of more consumer goods have fostered growing bitterness among the people. In a vicious circle of cause and effect, the productivity of labor has declined to a point bordering on sabotage and the country's economic stagnation has been deepening. If Gomulka continues to impose harsher controls, he will place in jeopardy all of the public support and economic gains that have accrued to the regime as a result of the 1956 reforms. The pattern of tightening is

evident in the realms of public expression and religion as well as in security.

Freedom of Expression. The Poles' strongest desires for emancipation are in this field and it is here that the Gomulka regime has most sharply curtailed earlier concessions. The highly popular and revisionist weekly, Po Prostu, was closed only one year after the Polish October, signalling the regime's return to a more rigidly repressive policy. The once flourishing discussion clubs of the young intellectuals have been closed. Distributors of offending books or periodicals have been jailed and prize winning plays, critical of the regime, have been banned by censors. Progressive writer and editor Henryk Holland died in police custody in 1962, officially reported as a "suicide," but apparently in reprisal for having had close contacts with foreign journalists. The freedom of writers to travel abroad has been severely restricted. Finally, Warsaw's two influential literary weeklies, Nowa Kultura and Przegląd Kulturalny, were closed in 1963 and were replaced by Kultura, the stated mission of which was to "serve the cause of the many-faceted developments of socialist culture, stressing the achievements and perspectives of the cultural revolution in Poland." Or, as Gomulka put it to the Thirteenth Plenum of the PZPR Central Committee in summer of 1963, "We do not and will not allow the propagation of ideas hostile to socialism, ideas that are harmful from the point of view of our educational work." With the closure of these two weeklies, the Party has closed an era of outstanding Polish achievement in the creative fields of literature, art, theater and the cinema. The editorial content of the new Kultura, while less dogmatic than feared, has reflected the emptiness of the socialist "cultural model." Creative talents and the deep desire for freedom of expression are still very much alive but they are silenced in Poland by the growing control of hard-line Party functionaries over the entire field of culture. For broader coverage of this subject, see "Eclipse of the Polish October," from Problems of Communism, Sept-Oct 1963, included in Press Comment of 5 Nov 1963.

Religion. Gomulka saw the church-state agreement of October 1956 only as establishing a modus vivendi based on the status quo. Thus, in violation of the agreement concluded between Gomulka and Cardinal Wyszynski just prior to the parliamentary election of January 1957, religious instruction in public schools was subsequently curtailed.

During an interview with the Le Monde editor-in-chief in 1961, Gomulka replied to the question of whether religion was to disappear with the older generations under Poland's "own road" course by saying,

"Religion is deeply anchored in the greatest part of our population. It would be senseless for us to try to force changes and convictions of faith by administrative means. . . . It is difficult

to say how long religious belief will continue to exist in Poland. Certainly for decades, possibly still longer. . . . The only thing we do not want is for the Church to be used in opposition to us and to socialism"

Gomulka naturally failed to mention that he used pseudo-Roman Catholic political groups in an effort to weaken the influence of the church. Nor has the regime by any means forsaken "administrative means" against the church. In 1963 a pattern of operations has emerged for regime seizure by force of property belonging to Roman Catholic religious orders, with geographic coordination of seizures apparently effected carefully in Warsaw. By the end of August 1963 all but one of the minor seminaries, devoted to the training of future clergy at high school level, had been closed by the State and harassment of major seminaries had begun. Nuns have been driven out of work in most of the former church hospitals, which were first made state property, and today nursing nuns operate only in sanatoria for the hopelessly ill and for retarded children. However, despite the regime's unacknowledged campaign against the church as an institution, individual religious freedom in the narrow sense of the term does continue to exist, both for religious minorities and for the Roman Catholic majority.

Agriculture. Agriculture has remained a major problem despite the fact that it has been relatively more successful in Poland than in most Communist states. It is notable that Polish agriculture, among the most productive in the Soviet Bloc, has always been the least collectivized. Added to this, the 1956 uprising impelled the regime to permit a mass dissolution of collectives and additional incentives were given to farmers in the form of higher delivery prices or lower quotas of forced deliveries. Production increases followed. Extremely adverse weather and crop conditions have recently hurt Polish agricultural production just as in the rest of Europe. Official pronouncements express concern over production levels. These pronouncements bring to mind the consistent reiteration by Gomulka and other regime officials that the Polish peasantry must ultimately be led to agricultural collectivization.

5X1C10b

25X1C10b

Approved For Release 1999/08/24 : CIA-RDP78-03061A000200040003-4

Approved For Release 1999/08/24 : CIA-RDP78-03061A000200040003-4

2 December 1963

717 EE,WE,a. An Italian CP "Declaration of Independence"

25X1C10b

BACKGROUND: The 26 October issue of the PCI daily organ L'Unita carried a 12,000-word statement adopted by a CC plenum the day before, entitled "For a New Advance and For the Unity of the International Communist Movement," which is the strongest and most effective presentation to date of their "creative development in Marxist thinking" in accordance with the "new situation (which) has grown up to face the Communist movement." It presents persuasive arguments for revisionism, reformism and polycentrism.

Acknowledging that "the Communist movement as a whole has been slow to grasp the real meaning of the changes that have come about," the Italian Communist leaders again praise the 20th CPSU Congress, which "constituted a first giant step toward making up for lost time, . . . hailed by Communist Parties throughout the world as the beginning of a grand reformation of the entire movement." Throughout the text they condemn the Chinese for their "dogmatic approach, closed and sectarian" views, and their "attack, pushed to the point of exasperation and in fact to the limits of endurance, against the CPSU and other Communist parties."

Along with their general rebuttal of the Chinese line, however, the Italians subtly take advantage of the situation to reinforce their demand for independence for their Party, for other parties and for the international front organizations, from Soviet (as well as Chinese) domination or interference. Translating their concept of independence into action, the Italians opposed an apparent Soviet plan to convene an early conference of world parties to force the issue with the Chinese (most observers believe that the CPI action was a major factor in stopping this Soviet move), emphasized their own conviction that bilateral relationships should be "the principal form of contact, debate and collaboration among parties," and that "considerable benefit can be derived" from such collaboration "among parties working in the same part of the world, where all face certain major issues and problems in the common struggle." They declare: "Insofar as we ourselves are concerned, we shall go on working to get such channels established, to serve the European Common Market Area, and all of capitalistic Europe."

On the specific issues in dispute in the Communist world today (war and peace, revolution and national liberation, transition to and building of socialism), the Italian statement sets forth views so "reformist," even "democratic," that they could be said to verge on the platforms of some of the free world's socialist parties. It does not mince words in

calling for "the total liquidation of those illegal restrictions on and violations of the principles of democracy and socialist legality which for too long have tarnished the socialist ideal and hampered economic construction and democratic growth, both in the Soviet Union and in the other socialist countries." Their arguments are on a far more intelligent and persuasive (from a free world view, at least) level than those of the Soviets or the Chinese.

The full text of this highly significant statement in English translation was published in No. 523 of the series Translations on International Communist Developments, JPRS: No. 21,770, dated 7 November 1963. Selected passages are quoted in an unclassified attachment to this guidance.

25X1C10b



25X1C10b

Approved For Release 1999/08/24 : CIA-RDP78-03061A000200040003-4

Approved For Release 1999/08/24 : CIA-RDP78-03061A000200040003-4

5X1C10b 718 AF, FE, NE, WH. The 70th Birthday of Mao Tse-tung

BACKGROUND: Mao Tse-tung was born on December 26, 1893 in the village of Shao Shan, Hunan Province. His parents were poor peasants who, as Mao grew into boyhood, gradually improved the family status and became rather well-to-do. Mao was given the usual formal education but early in life turned his interest to Marxism and to revolutionary activity. He was one of the founders of the Chinese Communist Party and has devoted his entire life to it. In 1931 he became Chairman of the Soviet Republic of China and in 1934 he led the famed "Long March" from Kiangsi Province to Yen-an (6,000 miles). After World War II he led the Communists in their civil war against the government, ending in the defeat of Chiang Kai-shek's Kuomintang. Mao, long the central figure in the Chinese Communist Party, has dominated it and the government of the Chinese People's Republic since it came to power on October 1, 1949.

Law prohibits celebration of leaders' birthdays. Mao's upcoming birthday will probably be the occasion of at least some celebration in spite of the fact that the CCP Central Committee in 1949 passed a resolution prohibiting celebrations of the birthdays of living Party leaders. Regardless of how the Chinese Communists choose to mark the occasion, it provides an excellent opportunity for reviewing and evaluating Mao's contribution to the Chinese people as well as to Marxism-Leninism and the International Communist Movement. Granted that Mao was a great revolutionary leader and a highly skilled general in guerrilla warfare, he is nevertheless vulnerable for the dismal failure of Chinese Communist domestic policies and their disastrous results on the living standards of the Chinese people.

Similarity to Stalin. Mao, like Stalin as soon as he had consolidated his authority, initiated a period of terror the extent of which will never be fully known. Like Stalin's purges, Mao's reached down into the remotest villages effecting the lives of nearly everyone on the Chinese Mainland. Mao may have had his differences with Stalin but he imitated him quite deliberately in choosing terror as his weapon for ensuring the permanence of the Communist revolution. Even the tactics chosen were similar: The Communist cadres aroused the villages and set class against class, group against group until thousands of people had been wiped out. The purges stopped as soon as Mao wanted them stopped -- and he wanted them stopped when in their wake they had created an all-pervasive environment of fear. Mao himself has said that 800,000 people were "liquidated"; Po Yi-po later raised the figure to two million, and Kuomintang officials put the figure at nine million. No one will ever know how many died; all that is known is that there was a bloodletting of

monstrous proportions and that the innocent suffered along with the guilty as the Communists relentlessly stamped their imprint on the country and its people.

Mao's domestic economic policies. Each of Mao's new policy pronouncements seems to lead to a new cycle of failure and is abandoned just in time to avert total disaster. In the Spring of 1956 Mao decided on the wildly unrealistic goal of a 150-percent increase in agricultural production within 12 years. In the Autumn of 1957 he set out a new course of socialist construction in China which was to rely on unprecedented organization and exploitation of human resources -- the formation of People's Communes as part of the Great Leap Forward. The attempt to establish communes with their quasi-military discipline envisaged a state of control over the lives of the peasants that even Stalin did not consider possible.

It has been said that Mao tries to rule the vast empire of China in the same way that he ruled a small valley in Yen-an where meal and clothing tickets largely took the place of money -- i.e. by a single authoritarian dictatorship. A single store in Yen-an catered to the needs of the whole population on the basis of tickets signed by Communist officials. Such a primitive system magnified several thousand times and applied to the whole of China has only compounded the troubles and difficulties that the Chinese people have had to face.

Regarding Mao's contribution to Marxism-Leninism and the International Communist movement, for many years he was applauded for having "adapted Marxism-Leninism to the conditions and situation in China" with the implication that the original tenets of Marxism-Leninism were inadequate and required adjustment or revision before they were applicable to Chinese conditions. But now that Mao has charged Khrushchev and the other Soviet leaders with Revisionism, Mao is no longer the adaptor but rather the most ardent and strictly orthodox follower of the purest form of Marxism-Leninism. He is, of course, not the first nor the last Communist leader to change his definitions and his position on Marxism-Leninism to suit the needs and demands of the moment.

Chinese propagandists try to portray Mao as a great original thinker and as an accomplished ideological theoretician in the tradition of Marx and Lenin. They have tried, with Mao's help to weave Mao's successes in the tactics of guerrilla warfare into doctrine on "the strategy of waging revolution from self-sustained rural bases." They also base their claim of Mao's worth as a Marxist philosopher on his "On Practice" and "On Contradictions," alleged to have been written in 1937 but not published until 1950 and 1952 respectively. Actually, "On Practice" is a paraphrased selection of portions of Lenin's Philosophical Notebooks and Materialism and Empirio-Criticism. "On Contradictions" is a similar rehash of what others have said about the unity of opposites. Mao's real role as a philosopher has been not as an originator or even as a skillful adaptor, but rather as a vulgarizer and a plagiarist.


The question of "peaceful coexistence" has played a crucial role in the Sino-Soviet rift, for which Mao bears a large part of the responsibility. Years ago in Yenan, in an interview with Robert Payne, in response to Payne's question regarding what the Chinese Communists would do if they were confronted with modern tanks, Mao answered that "they would tear them to pieces with their bare hands." Mao today is still the victim of his own experience; he thinks in terms of guerrilla warfare and is unable to deal with questions related to the power of modern weapons and thermonuclear destruction. At the time when other Communists are beginning to concede that not even Lenin, let alone Marx, could have foreseen the nature of thermonuclear war, Mao still adheres to outmoded concepts.

Mao honors Stalin. Ironically, in view of the fact that China was the arena of some of Stalin's most monumental blunders, (failure to recognize the importance of the peasantry and willingness to use the CCP as a pawn in his own international strategy) Stalin is more honored as a prophet in China than in Russia. Stalin's words, spoken in 1946 when the Soviet Union -- like China today -- still did not have atomic weapons, form the basis for Mao's current concepts of nuclear war. Stalin said: "I do not believe the atom bomb to be so serious a force as certain politicians are inclined to regard it. Atomic bombs are intended for intimidating weak nerves."

Another irony is that Mao is Stalin's staunchest defender and imitator today, although Mao disagreed with Stalin on many occasions and even instituted policies against the specific advice of Stalin, most notably the Chinese Communists' intensive and vigorous pursuit of the civil war against Chiang Kai-shek. The supreme irony is that Mao defends Stalin while pursuing policies more closely akin to the ideas of Stalin's arch enemy, Leon Trotsky! All of these conflicting and confusing aspects of Mao's loyalties, conceptions, and his policies are consistent with the interpretation that Mao's primary motivation and interest is in retaining his own position of power and authority over 700 million Chinese people and in furthering the age-old national aspirations of the Chinese race.

25X1C100

ACTION: The Chinese Communist Party is a



25X1C10b

Approved For Release 1999/08/24 : CIA-RDP78-03061A000200040003-4

Approved For Release 1999/08/24 : CIA-RDP78-03061A000200040003-4

719 AF,NE,f. Communist Education of Foreign Students

25X1C10b

BACKGROUND: The Soviet Union and her European satellites continue to expand educational opportunities for students from underdeveloped countries despite public criticism of strict Communist control over foreign students, despite the numbers of dissatisfied students who have fled Communist schools and revealed the political nature of their training. Riots against repressive treatment have taken place in several of the satellites, most recently in Bulgaria during February 1968 when African students loudly voiced their protests against being forbidden to form their own foreign students' organization and against discriminatory treatment.

None of the criticisms and revelations has slowed the Communist education program which has roughly trebled in size since 1960. Accurate statistics are difficult to obtain. Approximately 5,000 students from Africa alone are believed to be studying in the Communist bloc and a total of approximately 20,000 foreign students in all of the Communist countries. Although this does not compare with the nearly 200,000 foreign students from underdeveloped countries now enrolled in the United States, France, Great Britain and West Germany, it represents a tremendous investment in foreign youth elites by communist countries which need funds for capital investment themselves. Expansion of this increasingly expensive program is positive evidence of its importance to communism. Some clues to why it is important may be found in the treatment and use of the students during their years of schooling.

Privileged Students. Not all foreign students studying in the bloc are handled in the same fashion. Students recently returning to African countries have reported that there is a privileged group among them. Some receive special allowances; some are able to travel abroad even though they have no passports; some are accorded far better grades than their academic achievements warrant. Fellow students believe this special treatment represents payment for services rendered such as participation in propaganda broadcasts or interviews for publication; attendance at Communist front conferences as representatives of their home country; participation in "spontaneous demonstrations" against Western actions; leadership of associations of fellow students, from the homeland; and even informing on fellow students.

Students Return. The impact of large numbers of students returning home after several years of Communist education will not be felt for another few years, but a few returnees have spent several of their impressionable years with their Communist hosts. No consistent pattern emerges as to their political attitudes or the roles they will play in the community but some

common features do appear. Most of those who return are seeking jobs with their own governments who need and welcome trained personnel. /Almost all current leaders of East European satellites were trained in the USSR in the 1930s and 1940s. See Wolfgang Leonard, "Child of the Revolution".⁷ Others seek positions in mass media, youth organizations and labor groups.

For example, trade union activity absorbs many of the graduates, particularly from those East European schools which require that the student return to his own country after a year and put his knowledge to work. Some students have found positions with Communist front organizations. Paul Sekasi, a Ugandan who became the Uganda secretary for the Afro-Asian Peoples Solidarity Organization, was educated at Karl Marx University in Leipzig. Two Congolese (Brazzaville) who studied variously in Russia, Prague and Budapest, were prominent in the overthrow of President Youlou in August 1963. It is no accident that returning students seek positions with mass media. A new anti-Western Brazzaville weekly, Dipanda, is edited by two former students from Moscow; the chairman of the Tanganyika Broadcasting Corporation was trained in Prague and Leipzig.

25X1C10b



25X1C10b

Approved For Release 1999/08/24 : CIA-RDP78-03061A000200040003-4

Approved For Release 1999/08/24 : CIA-RDP78-03061A000200040003-4

/Excerpts from an Italian CP statement of 25
October 1968 which appeared in the Party's
daily organ L'Unita on 26 October.7

I -- THE STRUGGLE FOR PEACE AND FOR A REGIME OF COEXISTENCE

Copyright
We believe it a grave error,...to belittle or under-estimate the prospective catastrophe of atomic war. Even those who, like the Chinese comrades, would warn us against exaggerating the dangers inherent in a war, must admit that if imperialism were to touch off a conflict, more than half of all living beings would perish in the atomic holocaust. But it is at this point that the Chinese comrades start talking nonsense, and dangerously beguiling nonsense, at that: they maintain that the remaining handful of humanity to survive would swiftly rally, and join together to build a loftier, truly socialist civilization throughout the world. The truth is that the atomic blaze would destroy, in one blinding flash, the essential nerve-centers of civilization, and might well attack the very roots of life in nature and in man alike.

...

The error into which our Chinese comrades have fallen is that of under-estimating the value of civilization and culture to the world at large, and forgetting, at the same time, the anti-imperialist and revolutionary potentials which are inherent in the struggle for peace and for a regime of peaceful co-existence....

...The Chinese Communists went so far as to deny, in the teeth of all the evidence, and discarding all the struggles of the workers' movement for just such an end, that the truce /nuclear test-ban treaty7 had any immediate value. They hesitated not at all in rushing into the most obvious kind of self-contradiction, by scorning this partial, but at least practical and positive gain, and contrasting it with the general final goal of atomic and general disarmament, forgetting that they themselves had only recently dismissed this latter concept as "pure illusion...."

It took the test-ban treaty to make China publicly admit that she would like her own atomic arsenal....

It is true that they say it is wise to formulate proposals for general disarmament; they do it themselves....But actually, they nowhere cross the threshold of political and agitation

CPYR propaganda, since they affirm at the same time that there can be no disarmament, no lasting peace in the world until imperialism is finally laid low. This is the way in which they cast doubt on and, in essence, reject the revolutionary strategic struggle that has its roots in peaceful coexistence and conceives of the advance towards socialism as a movement involving people from every battleground of class conflict and competition between peoples and States, and moves ahead from victory to victory. The Chinese comrades...are trapped in a false dilemma-peace or revolution...Finally, they wind up embracing a policy whose sole aim, if we look at it objectively, is to heighten tensions, and whose potential includes the admitted possibility of nuclear war.

The Communist movement and our Party must mince no words in condemning this barren and foolhardy prospect.

II -- NEW ROADS THAT LEAD TO SOCIALISM

...

A glance at the worldwide history of the transition from capitalism to socialism shows no sudden, catastrophic collapse of capitalism in a grand Armageddon, but the pattern is clear nonetheless: it consists of a tissue of revolutionary victories and conquests, some of them big ones, some of them little ones, all of which influence each other, to combine in the great drive towards the common end.

Hence the necessity for the emphasis on specific and national differences in the revolutionary pattern in the several countries and in the different areas of the world. A grand strategy which would confine the overall revolutionary struggle to the pattern of the October Revolution in Russia, or to any other cast-iron model, is a strategy that fails to reckon with the real, present-day situation, a strategy that hinders rather than helping the drive and the force of the Communist Parties, a strategy that would drive them into sterility, confined to propaganda and to passive waiting for the millenium. The quest for national paths to socialism in no way implies any fragmentation of the revolutionary movement into so many separate and self-sufficient struggles. On the contrary, it is the one way to intervene successfully in all the conflicts that beset the modern world,...to build a genuinely unified and soundly oriented strategy for the international Communist movement.

Against this background, we maintain that there is opening up today, in many capitalist countries like Italy, a new path for peaceful and democratic advance towards socialism. The Chinese comrades are deliberately distorting and falsifying our positions when they describe the peaceable and democratic path to socialism as a minor-league action, involving only the electoral struggles, or only the parliament. When we talk about a peaceable and democratic way, we are talking about a

way that will lead the working class and its allies into the seats of political power, and do so without recourse to guerilla warfare or to civil war. We are talking about something alive and vital....We are talking about a many-sided struggle, one that hits the class enemy from every angle, one that builds a unified movement which, under the leadership of the working class, will be able to step in, in the shop and in the social club, in the pre-election scramble and in the government office, and say its say. It is through struggles like these that we have worked...to rally to its standard the great masses of the people,...to push through reforms in the economic structure and in the political establishment, designed to improve the living conditions of the masses and, at the same time, strike a blow at the pattern of ownership (through agrarian reform, nationalization, democratic economic planning, and the like) and at the organization of the State. This strategy is the direct opposite of the do-nothing policies the Chinese comrades would attribute to us; it is a strategy that will, as of now, build up a struggle for political power, and for the advent of the rule of the working class.

...

...(The) Chinese view arbitrarily lumps together, and thereby confuses, situations in which parliamentary institutions, elected assemblies, and formal rights to liberty have never existed, or have had only a marginal existence, with others in which such conventions and institutions are deeply rooted in the consciences, in the struggles, and in the experience of the great masses....

We emphatically affirm that today, in very many advanced capitalist countries, the attack on the mastery of monopoly capitalism, the drive to win over a majority of the people and to build a new society, can and must develop through the institutions of representative democracy, the elective political assemblies and the rights to liberty that are linked with them, as well as along other lines. The sum total of the changes, both objective and subjective, that have occurred in the advanced capitalist countries, have led in turn to major changes in the arrangement and in the structures of the State. There has been an enormous growth in the public share of the economy, in direct State intervention in the economy and in production, and in State capitalism. The relationship between politics and economics has drawn very close indeed. There is a whole body of popular pressure building up behind political demands that will affect the entire sphere of the economy, and an imposing array of new gains that will materially affect both politics and the economy.

...

In western Europe, a socialist solution that would destroy the basis of the economic and political power of the big capitalist bourgeoisie must-not only guarantee food and jobs. It

must also stand ready to guarantee a fast-paced growth in production, to implement an economic plan with incentives for individual initiative, to rule society by guaranteeing a broad range of autonomy and of political liberty, and to foster the free pursuit of learning and the continual exchange of ideas.

CPYRIGHT By moving, as of right now, in this direction and with this prospect before us, can we fully respond to the surging demand from the very heart of the masses; only so can we win to us and unite the majority of the working class and of the people. We have suffered too much in the past from narrow minds that could not understand this need....It is time we reflected a bit on the objective causes and the subjective limitations that have led the workers' movement into serious defeats in the advanced capitalist countries.

...

...We cannot overlook the power and the depth of the socialist and Catholic movements in western Europe, even within the working class, without falling prey to that infantile extremism which Lenin, reflecting on the experience of the immediate post-war period, so harshly criticized....

It is no accident that the Chinese comrades' position results in a line that is profoundly mistaken on one issue vital to the action of the workers' movement: the issue of the unity, the nature, and the objectives of the mass organizations on the world-wide level. We must guard against any tendency to consider the world mass organizations as merely projections and tools of party policy. The Chinese comrades do take this view of these organizations; furthermore, of recent years they have worked to make them the tools of the particular political line they would impose on all Communists, thus imperilling our unity.

The Italian Communists stand ready to fight for the autonomy of all such organizations. The recognition and respect of the autonomy of the world mass organizations, on everyone's part, is an essential condition if these organizations are to extend their scope and their united capacity for action, and therefore if they are to conduct a successful struggle for the specific goals proper to each of them, and for the overall objectives of peace and progress, to which the great masses of the people aspire....

III -- THE PROBLEMS OF BUILDING SOCIALISM

The

...

The abolition of capitalism, and the liquidation of the old exploiting classes, lead to the end of the conflicts peculiar to class societies....And yet, even the new socialist societies show acute and deep-rooted conflicts....

When, just for example, the USSR decides to begin the difficult transition to a higher phase of socialism, its decision

Approved For Release 1999/08/24 : CIA-RDP78-03061A000200040003-4

is derived from an objective necessity, from the very forces that the building of socialism set in motion, from a ripening of the entire Soviet society, not to mention the demands of competition with capitalism. This drive of the Soviet peoples towards greater well-being is born of new needs that have slowly ripened, of the awareness that the masses have of these needs, and of a desire for progress that cannot be frustrated. It is ridiculous and impossible to tell the Soviet people to wait. We should instead ask the Soviet people to move forward with courage and with vigor, because their new achievements will provide a new drive and new enthusiasm for the whole socialist camp, which will make it possible, step by step, to achieve the complex and fair equilibrium among the varying requirements of development for each country, in the interests of the common struggle and the common cause.

Of primary importance, not only for economic progress, but for the continued advance of the socialist countries and of the entire workers' and Communist movement throughout the world, is the abolition and the total liquidation of those illegal restrictions on and violations of the principles of democracy and socialist legality, which for too long have tarnished the socialist ideal and hampered economic construction and democratic growth, both in the Soviet Union and in the other socialist countries. These grave distortions have seriously impeded the spread of socialist influence throughout the world, and have been, as they are to this day, a potent weapon for our enemies. The advance of our ideals in the countries still subject to capitalist domination will be the surer and swifter, the more closely progress in economic construction in the socialist countries is followed by the growth of a richly democratic life, evidenced in every facet of society.

This is why it is so wrong and so harmful for the Chinese comrades to try to defend the methods associated with the cult of personality....

IV -- UNITY IN THE INTERNATIONAL COMMUNIST MOVEMENT: THE ISSUES

...

The current debate among the Communist Parties is inevitable and necessary....any position which, starting from the difficulties, the divergent views, and the differentiations existing today, reasoned to the abandonment of the job and the struggle for ideological and political unity in the Communist movement on the international scale, would perforce be a mistaken one. Therefore, the schismatic and sectarian activities pursued by the Chinese comrades today are to be rejected, as a genuine threat to this unity.

...

There is no contradiction between the need for unity in our movement and the need for autonomy and independence for every party. What does it really mean, in fact, this "autonomy

Approved For Release 1999/08/24 : CIA-RDP78-03061A000200040003-4

COPYRIGHT

for every party? It means, and ought to mean, full respect for the principle of non-interference by any party in the internal affairs of other parties, even in the necessary debate and comparison of opinions. It means that every party is responsible only to its own people for its own policy, and for the contribution it makes to the general orientation and to the progress of the movement as a whole, and that no Party need feel itself responsible for every position of every individual act of other parties, in whose decisions it has no part, and which may, in addition, be in conflict with the general principles that motivate our movement....

It is on the basis of this concept of unity in diversity and in autonomy that we believe the problems of the patterns of contact and collaboration among Communist Parties, and the issues involving the method and tone of debate within our movement ought to be approached.

Our Party believes that the principal form of contact, debate and collaboration among parties should consist of closer bilateral relationships....Our Party has done some intensive work of recent years on the level of exchange of delegations and bilateral relations....We shall keep trying, in this way as in others, to establish broader contact with revolutionary Parties and movements outside Europe as well (particularly those in Latin America and in Africa), whose problems and needs we think require special study, and which may possibly profit by a knowledge of our experiences.

We also believe that considerable benefit can be derived (witness the early experiments made in western Europe, with the Conference of the 17 Parties in 1959) from contacts, meetings, and collaboration among Parties working in the same part of the world, where all of them face certain major issues and problems in the common struggle. In this field, it will probably be found necessary to establish some formal channels for regular consultations and coordination. Insofar as we ourselves are concerned, we shall go on working to get such channels established, to serve the European Common Market area, and all of capitalist Europe.

We are fully aware of the special value, at certain times, of international conferences attended by the entire Communist movement. They enrich and deepen our joint appreciation of the international situation, clarify the major lines of our global strategy, and even help us in our approach to specific problems. The essential condition for their convocation, however, is an examination of the real chances they afford for furthering an analysis of the situation and working out a common orientation, for reaching clear-cut conclusions, and for achieving progress towards unity in the movement. Important requirements for such conferences, if they are to be useful and effective, are good timing, adequate preparation, and a clear and realistic idea of the topics to be discussed and of the objectives that can and should be achieved.

Our Party feels called upon to express some reservations as to the advisability of calling another international conference of the Communist and workers' Parties to discuss the situation currently existing in the Communist movement. Such a conference might well, if summoned today, find itself faced with a choice between two solutions equally prejudicial to the Communist movement: either a heightening of the present differences, with a possible schism, or a completely formal and unsatisfactory compromise....

...

Certainly it would be a truly starry-eyed innocent who would fail to see that, under today's conditions, the debate over current differences and the argument over the proper political line cannot but be both heated and wrathful. However, very particular condemnation is due the insults, the anathemas, the charges of betrayal that the Chinese comrades were the first to hurl at the other Communist Parties, and in particular at the CPSU....A very different thing from legitimate polemics is the agitation, the schismatic action, and the intolerable factional activities in which the Chinese comrades are engaged; a very different thing, and equally deprecable, is the casual way in which the Chinese comrades twist and distort the views and the lines of the other Parties as a standard procedure in their repertoire of debate;...Finally, there is grounds for serious concern in the way the growing heat of the debate has harmed State relations between socialist countries.